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intelligence accountability. It directs attention to the veillant panoptic assemblage (an arrangement of profoundly une-
qual mutual watching, where citizens’ watching of self and others is, through corporate channels of data flow, fed back 
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1. Introduction 
Drawing from three fields of study that rarely cross-
fertilise, Surveillance Studies, Intelligence Studies and 
Journalism Studies, I examine the contemporary condi-
tion of surveillance post-Snowden, exploring issues of 
intelligence agencies’ accountability, and resistance to 
surveillance. While offering a sizeable literature on sur-
veillance of citizens’ data (“dataveillance” (Clarke, 
1988, p. 499)) by commercial corporations, these three 
fields say little on surveillance of citizens’ communica-
tions by intelligence agencies, or on how to resist sur-
veillance. These are major lacunae given the 2013 leaks 
by Edward Snowden on the extensive nature and 
means of contemporary digital surveillance of citizens’ 
communications by their intelligence agencies in liberal 
democracies, with seemingly unwilling complicity from 
commercial internet and telecommunications compa-
nies (Harding, 2014; Intelligence and Security Commit-
tee [ISC], 2015). More usefully, however, Surveillance 
Studies, Intelligence Studies and Journalism Studies 
each discuss how public organs can hold those in pow-
er, including the political-intelligence elite, to account 
(here termed public oversight mechanisms). Synthesis-
ing this literature provides conceptual tools and a 
framework for evaluating how, and the extent to 
which, contemporary state intelligence surveillance 
may be held to account by civil society, as well as how 
the surveillance may be resisted.  
Traditional forms of intelligence oversight operate 
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via internal mechanisms (Inspectors General in the 
USA), the legislature (closed committees, such as the 
USA’s Senate Intelligence Committee and the UK’s In-
telligence and Security Committee (ISC)), the judiciary 
(secret courts, such as the USA’s Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court and the UK’s Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal) and the quasi-judicial (Information Commis-
sioners in the UK). However, intelligence agencies may 
also be held to account through public oversight mech-
anisms. Those most frequently discussed by Intelli-
gence Studies and Journalism Studies are the press act-
ing in its fourth estate capacity. Surveillance Studies 
adds to this a discussion of public oversight mecha-
nisms suited to ordinary citizens, through Mann’s 
(2013) concepts of “veillance” or mutual watch-
ing/monitoring. These include “sousveillance”, various-
ly described as watching from a position of powerless-
ness, watching an activity by a peer to that activity, and 
watching the watchers; and “equiveillance”, where a 
balance, is achieved between surveillant and sousveil-
lant forces. Accepting the inevitability of surveillance in 
contemporary societies, Mann and Ferenbok (2013, p. 
26) seek to counter-balance surveillance by increasing 
sousveillant oversight from below (what they term 
“undersight”) facilitated through civic and technology 
practices. Once this balance is achieved, they suggest 
that such a society would be “equiveillant”. 
While it can be queried whether equiveillance is 
achievable given the scale and nature of the surveil-
lance that Snowden revealed, clearly the published 
leaks themselves formed an important site of re-
sistance to intelligence agencies’ surveillance practices, 
generating international public, political and commer-
cial interventions to counter intelligence agencies’ sur-
veillance and hold intelligence agencies to account. 
These struggles over multiple forms of mutual watch-
ing and monitoring involved citizens variously acting as 
whistle-blowers and subjects of surveillance; journal-
ists variously acting to challenge and condone the mass 
surveillance; and private corporations variously acting 
to surveil, and block surveillance of, our communica-
tions. Given the scale, nature and political and social 
impact of Snowden’s revelations, as a case study it pre-
sents a politically important and intense manifestation 
of the phenomenon of veillance, providing an infor-
mation-rich site for studying veillant processes, includ-
ing the role played by public oversight mechanisms 
therein.  
This enables refinement of theory on veillance suit-
able to the contemporary surveillant condition. Prob-
lematising the concept of equiveillance in a post-
Snowden context, I propose what I term the veillant 
panoptic assemblage (an arrangement of profoundly 
unequal mutual watching, where citizens’ monitoring 
of self and others is, through corporate channels of da-
ta flow, fed back into state surveillance of citizens). Fi-
nally, I evaluate post-Snowden steps taken towards 
achieving what I term an equiveillant panoptic assem-
blage (where, alongside surveillance of citizens, the in-
telligence-power elite, to ensure its accountability, fac-
es robust scrutiny and action from wider society). This 
draws on Mann and Ferenbok’s (2013, p. 26) frame-
work for encouraging equiveillance by increasing 
sousveillant “undersight” through civic and technology 
practices—namely better whistle-blower protection, 
public debate, participatory projects and systems inno-
vations. Applying this framework to the Snowden case 
study allows evaluation of resistive forces to contem-
porary state intelligence surveillance. This draws criti-
cal attention to whether post-Snowden transparency 
arrangements are adequate, highlighting productive 
avenues for further research.  
2. Context 
2.1. The Dataveillance 
The published Snowden leaks claim that the data that 
intelligence agencies bulk collect includes communica-
tion content (such as email, instant messages, the 
search term in a Google search, and full web browsing 
histories); file transfers; and what is called communica-
tions data (in the UK) and metadata (in the USA) (for 
instance, who the communication is from and to 
whom; when it was sent; duration of the contact; from 
where it was sent, and to where; the record of web 
domains visited; and mobile phone location data) (Ca-
nadian Journalists for Free Expression, 2015).  
The leaks state that communication content and 
communications data/metadata are collected in bulk 
from two sources. Firstly, the servers of US companies 
(via Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchroni-
sation and Management (PRISM)). This has been run 
since 2007 by the USA’s signal agency, the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA), in participation with global inter-
net, computer, social media and telecommunications 
companies (Microsoft, Yahoo! Google, Facebook, Pal-
talk, YouTube, AOL, Skype and Apple), although not 
necessarily with their consent as PRISM allows the NSA 
to unilaterally seize communications directly from 
companies’ servers). Due to the internet’s architecture, 
the USA is a primary hub for worldwide telecommuni-
cations, making these servers data-rich. The second 
source of bulk data collection is directly tapping fibre-
optic cables carrying internet traffic. The NSA does this 
through the UPSTREAM programme. The UK does this 
through TEMPORA, run since 2011 by the UK’s signal 
intelligence agency, Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), in participation with BT, Voda-
fone Cable, Verizon Business, Global Crossing, Level 3, 
Viatel and Interoute. Between 10−25% of global inter-
net traffic enters British territory through these cables 
en route eastwards, making the UK an important inter-
net traffic hub. TEMPORA stores this data flowing in 
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and out of the UK, sharing it with the USA (Anderson, 
2015; Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, 2015; 
Royal United Services Institute [RUSI], 2015).  
Reportedly, in the UK, the content of communica-
tions is stored for three days and metadata for up to 
thirty days (Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, 
2015). The UK’s Interception of Communications 
Commissioner’s Office (IOCCO) finds that “every agen-
cy has a different view on what constitutes an appro-
priate retention period for material” (May, 2015, p. 
33); and RUSI (2015, p. 22) finds that British intelligence 
agencies keep bulk data sets for as long as they deem 
their utility reasonable or legitimate. (Storage lengths 
have not been confirmed by intelligence agencies (ISC, 
2015)). In the USA, PRISM data is stored for five years 
and UPSTREAM data for two years (Simcox, 2015).  
Intelligence agencies have analytics programs to 
help them select and analyse this collected content. 
British intelligence agencies reveal their analytics com-
prise “automated and bespoke searches”, with “com-
plex searches combining a number of criteria” con-
ducted to reduce false positives (ISC, 2015, p. 4). 
Volunteering information not published from the 
Snowden leaks, UK intelligence agencies state that they 
generate Bulk Personal Datasets, namely large data-
bases (up to millions of records) “containing personal 
information about a wide range of people” (ISC, 2015, 
p. 55) to identify targets, establish links between peo-
ple and verify information. While intelligence agencies 
are largely silent on their analytics programmes, the 
published Snowden leaks have furnished details. They 
allegedly comprise PRINTAURA, which automatically 
organises data collected by PRISM; FASCIA, which al-
lows the NSA to track mobile phone movements by col-
lecting location data (which mobiles broadcast even 
when not being used for calls or text messages; CO-
TRAVELER, which looks for unknown associates of 
known intelligence targets by tracking people whose 
movements intersect; PREFER, which analyses text 
messages to extract information from missed call alerts 
and electronic business cards (to establish someone’s 
social network) and roaming charges (to establish bor-
der crossings); XKEYSCORE, which is an NSA program 
allowing analysts to search databases covering most 
things typical users do online, as well as engaging in re-
al-time interception of an individual’s internet activity; 
and DEEP DIVE XKEYSCORE that promotes to TEMPORA 
data ingested into XKEYSCORE with “potential intelli-
gence value” (Anderson, 2015, pp. 330-332).  
While governments maintain that their mass sur-
veillance programs are legal, civil society express fears 
that the executive, mindful of protecting national secu-
rity, pushes legal interpretation to its limits. For in-
stance, the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
[RIPA] 2000 allows bulk collection only of “external” in-
ternet communications, legally defined as communica-
tions sent or received outside the UK (at least one 
“end” of the communication must be overseas). How-
ever, the ISC (2015, p. 40) admits that, while agencies 
such as GCHQ would not be legally allowed to search 
for a specific individual’s communication from within 
this collected data if that individual was known to be in 
the UK, in practice it may be impossible for intelligence 
agencies to know locations of senders and recipients: 
as long as the analyst has a “belief” that the person is 
overseas, the communications would be analysed. 
(Similarly in the USA, individuals may be targeted for 
surveillance if they are “reasonably believed” to be 
outside the USA (Anderson, 2015, p. 368)). Moreover, 
British intelligence agencies classify communications 
collected as “external” when the location of senders or 
recipients is definitely unknown, as with Google, 
YouTube, Twitter and Facebook posts (unknown recipi-
ents); when accessing a website whose web server is 
located abroad; and when uploading files to cloud 
storage systems overseas, such as Dropbox (ISC, 2015; 
Simcox, 2015). 
Furthermore, in terms of internet and telephony 
communications data, the ISC (2015) acknowledges 
that such data is highly intrusive given that the volume 
of data produces rich profiles of people. Recognising its 
intrusive nature, the USA has restricted its surveillance 
of American citizens’ communications data, with the 
signing into law on 2 June 2015 of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending 
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitor-
ing [USA FREEDOM] Act (HR 2048). This imposes new 
limits on bulk collection of communications data on 
American citizens. It demands the use of more specific 
selection terms, and prohibits bulk collection using 
broad geographic terms (such as a state code) or 
named communications service providers (such as Ver-
izon) (Federation of American Scientists [FAS], 2015). 
2.2. The Struggle 
Intelligence agencies and their official oversight bodies 
maintain that their mass surveillance programs are 
necessary to pre-empt and control security risks—this 
stance mirroring the post-“9/11” shift in the concept of 
security in the USA and European Union (EU) (Pavone, 
Esposti, & Santiago, 2013, p. 33). A complete data set 
enables discovery of new, unknown threats, as past in-
formation may help connect needed “identifiers” (such 
as telephone numbers or email addresses) and reveal 
new surveillance targets. This leads to a “collect every-
thing” mentality (ISC, 2015; Simcox, 2015). Rejecting 
the term “surveillance”, intelligence agencies state that 
rather than conducting blanket searches, as implied by 
press accounts of “drag-net” surveillance, they only 
search for specific information (Director of National In-
telligence, 2013; ISC, 2015; National Academies of Sci-
ences, 2015). The UK’s intelligence oversight commit-
tee concludes that such “bulk data collection” does not 
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constitute mass surveillance since British intelligence 
agencies do not have “the resources, the technical ca-
pability, or the desire to intercept every communica-
tion of British citizens, or of the internet as a whole” 
(ISC, 2015, p. 2). However, given the rapidity of techno-
logical and analytical Big Data developments (as the 
ability to collect, connect and derive meaning from dis-
parate data-sets expands) (Lyon, 2014); given secret in-
telligence-sharing relationships between “Five Eyes” 
countries (UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada) 
(Emmerson, 2014); and given that governmental “de-
sire” is susceptible to change, especially following ter-
rorist atrocities, this reassurance is hardly future-proof.  
Mass surveillance of citizens’ communications by 
intelligence agencies was undertaken without citizens’ 
knowledge (prior to Snowden’s leaks) or consent. 
Against mass surveillance stand those who fear gov-
ernment tyranny, such as the author of the Church re-
port (Church Committee, 1976). Senator Frank 
Church’s problem with NSA electronic communications 
surveillance capabilities in the Nixon era was that if the 
government ever became tyrannical, “there would be 
no way to fight back because the most careful effort to 
combine together in resistance to the government, no 
matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of 
the government to know” (Parton, 2014). Forty years 
later, Snowden’s revelations provoke similar warnings. 
For instance, the European Committee on Civil Liber-
ties, Justice and Home Affairs (2014, Finding 14) warns 
that “infrastructure for the mass collection and pro-
cessing of data could be misused in cases of change of 
political regime”. Meanwhile, a study of 2000 citizens 
from nine European countries regarding security-
oriented surveillance technologies (smart Closed Cir-
cuit Television, smartphone location tracking and deep 
packet inspection) shows public concerns about state 
surveillance. It finds that the public rejects blanket 
mass surveillance; tends to reject security-oriented 
surveillance technologies where they are perceived to 
negatively impact non-conformist behaviour; and de-
mands enforced and increased accountability, liability 
and transparency of private and state surveillant enti-
ties (Pavone, Esposti, & Santiago, 2015).  
This struggle between a political-intelligence elite 
that has imposed mass surveillance, and those who ob-
ject, initiated legislative consultation across political 
bodies. The United Nations and EU parliament called 
for evaluation and revision of national legislation con-
cerning oversight of intelligence agencies’ surveillance 
practices (European Committee on Civil Liberties, Jus-
tice and Home Affairs, 2014; United Nations, 2014). 
Legislative consultation ensued in multiple nations, tak-
ing evidence from businesses, Non-Governmental Or-
ganisations (NGOs), privacy advocates, the media, in-
telligence agencies, governments and legislatures. 
From the USA, four oversight reports have been deliv-
ered (National Academies of Sciences, 2015; The Presi-
dent’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communica-
tions Technologies, 2013; The Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board [TPCLOB], 2014a, 2014b). The UK has 
delivered one oversight report from the Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC, 2015); reports by the 
IOCC (May, 2015); and government-commissioned re-
ports on counter-terrorism measures (Anderson, 2015) 
and British surveillance (RUSI, 2015). Most of these re-
ports commend the existing surveillance regime as law-
ful, necessary, and valuable in protecting national secu-
rity and producing useful foreign intelligence, but also 
recommend changes to legislation and oversight con-
cerning intelligence agencies’ surveillance, and greater 
transparency. 
More critically, TPCLOB (2014a) concluded that NSA 
collection of telephone metadata was of minimal val-
ue, illegal, and should be ended. Accordingly, on 2 June 
2015, the USA Freedom Act was passed, restricting 
bulk collection of telephone metadata of American citi-
zens, although not of foreigners. Meanwhile, the Brit-
ish government has maintained the status quo on sur-
veillance legislation. In response to a ruling from the 
EU Court of Justice declaring invalid the EU Data Reten-
tion Directive, the UK passed emergency legislation, 
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 
[DRIPA], in July 2014. This allows security services to 
continue to access people’s phone and internet rec-
ords, by requiring telecommunications service provid-
ers to retain communications data in line with RIPA. As 
DRIPA expires at the end of 2016, the Anderson Report 
was commissioned to help Parliament determine 
whether DRIPA should be renewed. Neither Anderson 
(2015) nor RUSI (2015) recommend that bulk collection 
in its current form should cease given its utility in 
fighting terrorism. Anderson (2015) does, however, 
recommend that bulk collection of communications da-
ta should take place without (as currently) simultane-
ously needing to collect content. 
3. Methodology 
As this is a complex, unfolding phenomenon, a case 
study approach is utilised (Yin, 2013). Snowden’s leaks 
and their aftermath present a politically important and 
intensely manifested case study on “veillance”—
Mann’s (2013) term for processes of mutual watching. 
This enables assessment of resistive possibilities by civil 
society to contemporary state intelligence mass sur-
veillance; and an evaluation of civil society’s ability to 
hold intelligence agencies to account. This case study 
identifies core American and British actors participating 
in the struggle against intelligence agencies’ mass sur-
veillance, distilling their central arguments and actions. 
Writing from the perspective of two years after Snow-
den’s leaks, this enables an evaluation of the relative 
strengths of different aspects of sousveillant “under-
sight” identified by Mann and Ferenbok (2013), and 
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hence of the likelihood of achieving “equiveillance”. 
While Snowden leaked over 1.7 million intelligence 
files, few are published (Canadian Journalists for Free 
Expression, 2015). Better documented is what the 
leaks signify to core actors, with various perspectives 
gleaned for this case study. The US intelligence com-
munity’s public perspective is derived from the website 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (IC 
on the Record) launched in August 2013 to provide “the 
public with direct access to factual information related 
to the lawful foreign surveillance activities carried out 
by the Intelligence Community” (Clapper, 2013). This 
contains declassified documents, official statements, 
interviews, fact sheets, oversight reports and updates 
on oversight reform efforts. British intelligence agen-
cies’ public perspectives are gleaned from GCHQ’s 
website (GCHQ, n.d.); a public statement following an 
investigation to establish if GCHQ was circumventing 
the law (ISC, 2013); an ISC report stemming from an 
18-month inquiry into privacy and security (ISC, 2015); 
an IOCC report (May, 2015); and government-
commissioned reports on counter-terrorism measures 
(Anderson, 2015) and UK surveillance (RUSI, 2015) that 
interviewed the British intelligence agencies. 
Perspectives from journalists involved in the leaks 
are gleaned from the leaks’ reportage in two press out-
lets: the primarily British newspaper, The Guardian, 
with which Snowden’s desired first contact, Glenn 
Greenwald was affiliated, and The Intercept, a Web-
based reporting consortium which Greenwald then 
helped start. Books have been written by the journal-
ists involved: Greenwald (2014) and The Guardian’s 
Luke Harding (2014). The leaks have been discussed by 
Greenwald and Alan Rusbridger (The Guardian’s then 
editor) in publications, television interviews and ap-
pearances at UK-based anti-surveillance NGO meetings 
that I attended across 2014. Perspectives from whistle-
blower Snowden are garnered from his public declara-
tions online (Snowden, 2013a, 2013b); Greenwald’s 
(2014) and Harding’s (2014) books; and CitizenFour, the 
Oscar-winning documentary about Snowden by Laura 
Poitras (2014)—the first person that Snowden success-
fully contacted in attempting to reach Greenwald.  
NGO perspectives are gathered from public state-
ments at UK-based anti-surveillance workshops and 
conferences; and documentation abounds online. For 
instance, NGOs consulted by American and British re-
view and oversight boards spanned civil liberties, hu-
man rights, privacy, transparency and press freedom 
groups. Furthermore, in the UK, Privacy International, 
Bytes for All, Liberty, and Amnesty International have 
been pursuing a legislative remedy against the British 
surveillant state since Snowden’s leaks, this generating 
public documentation (Privacy International, 2015). 
Business perspectives from leading technology 
firms involved in the surveillance are derived from ma-
jor corporations’ own collective public actions, such as 
their formation of the Reform Government Surveil-
lance coalition in 2013, and their open letters to 
Obama and the US Congress in December 2013, and to 
the US Senate in November 2014, calling for surveil-
lance laws and practices to be changed - especially that 
governments should not bulk collect internet commu-
nications (Reform Government Surveillance coalition, 
2014). Also consulted were business’ written perspec-
tives to the review boards. For instance, TPCLOB 
(2014b) heard from technology trade associations rep-
resenting over 500 American and foreign based com-
panies from the information and communications 
technology sector, spanning infrastructure, computer 
hardware, software, telecommunications, consumer 
electronics, information technology, e-commerce and 
Internet services. Anderson (2015) and RUSI (2015) also 
discuss industry’s views having taken evidence from a 
broad range of telecommunications service providers. 
Having explained the case study’s context and 
methods, the following sections address the literature 
from Surveillance Studies, Intelligence Studies and 
Journalism Studies on public oversight mechanisms and 
the political-intelligence elite. This teases out relevant 
concepts and develops a framework for evaluating re-
sistance to contemporary state intelligence mass sur-
veillance, applying these insights to the Snowden case 
study. 
4. Public Oversight Mechanisms: Surveillance Studies 
Surveillance studies examines routine ways in which at-
tention is focused on personal details by organisations 
wishing to influence, manage or control certain per-
sons or population groups (Lyon, 2003, 2014). Howev-
er, Lyon (2015, p. 139) observes that the field’s re-
sponse to Snowden’s revelations lacks understanding 
of the “complex, large-scale, multi-faceted panoply of 
surveillance”. This includes ignorance of the technical 
infrastructure of global information flow and surveil-
lance; lack of clarity on who surveils, given the blurring 
between public and private sectors; and lack of under-
standing of surveillance cultures—for instance, how 
and why target populations enable, respond to, and re-
sist surveillance. Furthermore, as Klauser and Al-
brechtslund (2014, p. 284) propose in their research 
agenda on big data and surveillance, we need detailed 
research on “how different purposes of surveillance 
can be distinguished conceptually, with a view to inter-
rogating the mutual imbrications of different forms, 
functions and problems of surveillance.” I attempt, 
here, to progress conceptual interrogation of surveil-
lance by attending to the complexity of the surveillance 
that Snowden revealed. 
Surveillance is discussed through two main theoret-
ical frameworks: the panopticon and assemblage. Fou-
cault (1977) invokes Bentham’s (1791) Panopticon (a 
novel architecture enabling potentially constant sur-
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veillance of people within a specific space, such as 
prisons) as a symbol for contemporary methods of so-
cial control, highlighting the exercise of power through 
self-discipline, self-reflection and training of one’s soul 
under the eye of authority. By contrast, drawing on 
Deleuze (1992) and the metaphor of the surveillant as-
semblage, Haggerty and Ericson (2000, p. 606) argue 
that surveillance works by computers tracking persons, 
abstracting physical bodies from territorial settings into 
data flows to be reassembled as virtual “data-doubles”, 
these then targeted for intervention. In a society of 
ubiquitous computing and networks, this extends sur-
veillance to everyone. This represents a shift from Fou-
cault’s disciplinary enclosure to an amorphous “control 
society” (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 178-179) leading to 
“ceaseless control in open sites” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 
175). In simple terms, our digital identities (or data 
doubles) are assembled by aggregating and cross-
referencing multiple data trails that we leave across 
the de-centered, geographically dispersed, digital net-
work. These digital identities, while in constant flux, 
are temporarily and spatially fixed (that is, captured, 
analysed and acted upon) at multiple sites in the net-
work (for instance by marketers and state security 
agencies - the heterogeneous surveillant assemblage). 
This has consequences for our physical selves as the 
assemblage presumes to know who we are; what we 
say and do, where and with whom; and from this pre-
dict what we may be persuaded to consume, and what 
we might do in the future (Andrejevic, 2007, Haggerty 
& Ericson, 2000; Lyon, 2003, McStay, 2014).  
These metaphors of panopticon and assemblage 
have generated many studies of processes and conse-
quences of surveillance control, but few have studied 
issues of resistance (Fernandez & Huey, 2009). A prom-
inent exception is Steve Mann who, several decades 
ago, proposed the concept of sousveillance and devel-
oped sousveillant technologies. However, Mann’s con-
ception of sousveillance draws solely on the panopti-
con metaphor: as I argue below, we need a fusion 
between the metaphors of panopticon and assemblage 
to understand Snowden-revealed mass surveillance 
and possible resistance.  
Mann discusses two types of sousveillance. “Hierar-
chical” sousveillance refers to politically or legally mo-
tivated sousveillance (Mann, 2004; Mann, Nolan, & 
Wellman, 2003). Here, sousveillant individuals use 
tools (such as camera-phones) to observe organisa-
tional observers, enhancing people’s ability to access 
and collect data about their surveillance in order to 
neutralise it, and acting as a consciousness-raising 
force to the Surveillance Society. Hierarchical sousveil-
lance involves recording surveillance systems, propo-
nents of surveillance and authority figures to uncover 
the panopticon and “increase the equality” between 
surveillee and surveiller (Mann et al., 2003, p. 333). 
Mann (2004) also discusses “personal” sousveillance—
the recording of an activity by a person who is party to 
that activity, from first-person perspectives, without 
necessarily involving political agendas. With the mass 
take-up of social media globally, personal sousveillance 
is rife, involving people curating and creating content, 
thereby revealing their lives, thoughts and feelings 
(Pew Internet Research Centre, 2014). While hierar-
chical sousveillance is less common than personal 
sousveillance, the latter may serendipitously morph in-
to the former. A prominent example is when Military 
Police at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq took multiple pho-
tos on their camera-phones of their involvement in 
prisoner torture, these shared within their in-crowd 
and later leaked to the press, leading to the unraveling 
of the George W. Bush administration’s secret torture-
intelligence programme (Bakir, 2010, 2013). 
Given the prevalence of surveillance and sousveil-
lance’s rapid expansion, Mann and Ferenbok (2013, p. 
19) describe a “veillance” society of mutual watching 
and monitoring. They posit that if sousveillance be-
comes ubiquitous, and if coupled with political action 
to enact change from below, then we may reach a 
state of “equiveillance” where surveillance and 
sousveillance balance out (Mann & Ferenbok, 2013, p. 
26). They suggest that equiveillance would be achieved 
when: 
veillance infrastructures are extensive and the 
power requirements to enact change from below 
are marginal. This type of system would likely pro-
tect whistle-blowers, encourage public fora and de-
bate, and implement participatory projects and in-
novations to the system. Even the powers of 
oversight in this configuration are likely to be seen 
from below and subject to evaluation. (Mann & 
Ferenbok, 2013, p. 30) 
Pre-Snowden writings that apply sousveillance to con-
temporary social practices are drawn to the liberatory 
and consciousness-raising potential of sousveillance, 
but also note that anonymity for hierarchical sousveil-
lers is paramount for such social practices to take root 
(Bakir, 2010). Yet anonymity is precisely what is com-
promised by contemporary state mass surveillance. 
Here, the assemblage and panopticon mutually inform 
each other, with the assemblage (spear-headed by tel-
ecommunications companies) providing a stock of ana-
lysable material that the panopticon (state intelligence 
agencies) can appropriate. Lyon (2003) observed this 
soon after “9/11”, as governments traced terrorists’ 
activities through their data trails generated from fi-
nancial transactions and travel. Today, however, gov-
ernments’ data stock is exponentially greater, as digital 
communications are central to modern life. That intel-
ligence agencies accumulate and physically store this 
data for later searching and analysis to reveal new 
threats and to investigate persons of interest, and that 
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this has a chilling effect on society, reinforces the pan-
optic nature of this data re-appropriation. For instance, 
the Obama administration surveilled journalists’ per-
sonal emails to reveal the identity of national security 
leakers so that they can be prosecuted, such activity 
then discouraging government sources from discussing 
even unclassified information with journalists (Papan-
drea, 2014). To flag up state re-appropriation of citi-
zens’ communications for disciplinary purposes, includ-
ing data derived from personal and hierarchical 
sousveillance (from selfies to whistle-blowing), I call 
this the veillant panoptic assemblage.  
I have introduced this new term in an effort to bring 
conceptual clarity to the complicated post-Snowden 
condition of mutual watching, while also highlighting 
resistive possibilities to surveillance. Others have 
played with the term “panoptic” to capture contempo-
rary mediated, technological surveillance. Examples in-
clude the synopticon (the “viewer society” where the 
many watch the few (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 219)); the 
super-panopticon (where computer databases con-
struct subjects with dispersed identities (Poster, 
1997)); the banopticon (the security state’s power to 
ban inadequate individuals (Bigo, 2006)); and the oli-
gopticon (a networked form of surveillance nodes 
comprising special places such as parliaments, court-
rooms and offices where sturdy but narrow views of 
the (connected) whole are generated, as long as con-
nections hold (Latour, 2005)). In contrast to such ter-
minological playfulness with the central metaphor of 
panopticon, I posit that conceptual clarity of the post-
Snowden condition is heightened by maintaining intact 
the term “panoptic” (with its centralizing, state-
oriented and disciplinary functions) and coupling it 
with “assemblage” (highlighting the multi-site and fluc-
tuating nature of data capture to form data-doubles). 
Bringing these words together with “veillance” high-
lights two further important aspects. Firstly, that flows 
of watching and monitoring are multidirectional: they 
may comprise citizens monitoring themselves and oth-
ers (including power-holders), retail and communica-
tions companies monitoring customers, and the state 
monitoring everybody. Secondly, this new term high-
lights that resistance to surveillance may be attempted 
through different types of veillance. For instance, 
Mann and Ferenbok (2013) argue for more sousveil-
lance to strive towards equiveillance—their solution 
for rebalancing the Surveillance Society. However, in-
creased sousveillance is not the only possible mode of 
resistance to surveillance. Other modes include “coun-
terveillance” and “univeillance” (Mann, 2013). 
“Counterveillance” comprises measures taken to 
block both surveillance and sousveillance (Mann, 2013, 
p. 7). While Mann describes counterveillant technolo-
gies that detect and blind cameras, a non-
technological, if extreme, example is going off-grid—
total disengagement with all networked, mediated 
communications in the manner of Osama bin Laden in 
hiding. Indeed, as Anderson (2015, p. 160) observes, 
given the centrality of networked digital communica-
tions to everyday life, “one can opt out of data collec-
tion, but only by opting out of 21st century socie-
ty”.”Univeillance” is where surveillance is blocked but 
sousveillance enabled (Mann, 2013, p. 7). This can in-
clude technological solutions such as anonymisation 
and end-to-end encryption (which provides security at 
either end of the communication, so that only the re-
cipient, not the company running the communications 
service, can decrypt the message). These solutions re-
sist surveillance while encouraging people to continue 
with their normal communicative activities, including 
sousveillance. Certainly, many telecommunications and 
internet companies compelled by the state to partici-
pate in bulk collection have since sought to strengthen 
their privacy and encryption technologies. For exam-
ple, in November 2014, the popular messaging service, 
Whatsapp, announced that it would implement end-to-
end encryption. In September 2014 Apple and Google 
moved towards encrypting users’ data by default on 
their latest models of mobile phones, using their oper-
ating systems in a way that the companies themselves 
cannot decrypt (as the encryption on the device is us-
er-controlled), so making it difficult for governments to 
compel corporations to secretly participate in mass 
surveillance (Anderson, 2015; ISC, 2015; RUSI, 2015). 
Such measures, while an expression of the pro-
libertarian ethos of Silicon valley companies, are also a 
form of brand maintenance, designed to regain con-
sumer trust in companies’ ability to protect private da-
ta, as trade bodies anticipated that Snowden’s revela-
tions would lose the US cloud industry $35 billion over 
three years (Anderson, 2015, p. 203; TechNet, 2013). 
Journalists also increasingly use anonymisation and 
end-to-end encryption to protect their sources’ identi-
ty, their stories and themselves from state snooping 
(Carlo & Kamphuis, 2014; Harding, 2014). 
Post-Snowden, some telecommunications service 
providers have attempted to raise users’ awareness of 
surveillance. Twitter’s policy is to inform its users if 
they are under surveillance (unless specifically prohib-
ited from doing so by court orders) (Twitter, 2014). Ya-
hoo!, Twitter and Google have published transparency 
reports (since 2013 for Yahoo!, 2012 for Twitter and 
2009 for Google) showing how many requests from 
governments worldwide they have met (Google, 2015; 
Twitter, 2015; Yahoo, 2015). Such measures, in unveil-
ing the secrecy of the surveillance, provide a first step 
for users to assess if they want to take resistive 
measures such as counterveillance, or univeillance. Yet, 
making people understand and care about such issues 
is challenging given their abstract, complex nature. The 
role of national security whistle-blowers and the press 
then becomes paramount if hierarchical sousveillance 
is to flourish, or indeed equiveillance to be attempted. 
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With this in mind, the following section discusses the 
fields of Intelligence Studies and Journalism Studies to-
gether, as their insights on public oversight mecha-
nisms largely concern the press. 
5. Public Oversight Mechanisms: Intelligence Studies 
and Journalism Studies 
An emerging literature from Intelligence Studies and 
Journalism Studies examines the press’ ability to en-
sure public oversight of intelligence agencies (Hille-
brand, 2012; Johnson, 2014). However, while in liberal 
democracies the press claims to guard the public inter-
est (Boyce, 1978), the balance of research is pessimistic 
about how far this is possible in intelligence issues. In-
stead, most research finds that intelligence agencies 
successfully manipulate the press through strategies of 
secrecy and propaganda. These strategies are discussed 
below, with reference to the Snowden case study. 
Intelligence agencies deploy various secrecy-
maintaining techniques, the most basic of which is to 
withhold information (Bakir, 2013). The surprise of 
Snowden’s leaks in 2013 attests to the successful se-
crecy of surveillant intelligence practices, these dating 
back to changes in US surveillance law introduced un-
der Bush under s.215 of the Patriot Act [2001], and 
s.702 of the FISA Amendments Act [2008]. The most 
draconian secrecy-enforcing technique is prior con-
straint on what journalists can publish (Dee, 1989). Alt-
hough this is usually associated with 17th and 18th cen-
tury Britain (Curran, 1978), The Guardian believed that 
its biggest threat in the Snowden story was legal in-
junctions to prevent publication (Moore, 2014). Other 
secrecy-maintaining techniques are threats of criminal 
prosecution against whistle-blowers (Murakami Wood 
& Wright, 2015), although historically these rarely oc-
cur in the USA, with only three leakers prosecuted pri-
or to Obama. Yet, not including Snowden, the Obama 
administration has indicted seven government officials 
for leaking classified information; and on 14 June 2013, 
Snowden was charged under the Espionage Act [1917]. 
Through such actions, the US government hopes to dis-
courage further leaks in a digital age where technology 
makes leaking easy regarding scale of data that can be 
rapidly copied and the rise in online outlets like Wik-
ileaks that resist censorship. Another secrecy-
maintaining technique is blacklisting and harassing 
non-compliant press employees (Bewley-Taylor, 2008). 
Indeed, The Guardian’s employees were forced to 
physically smash their computer hard drives in London, 
under GCHQ’s tutelage, in July 2013 after The Guardian 
refused to hand back or destroy Snowden’s docu-
ments, even though its editor pointed out that such 
destruction was meaningless as its New York office 
held copies of the documents, as did Greenwald in Bra-
zil and Poitras in Berlin (Rusbridger, 2013). The most 
common secrecy-maintaining technique is to engender 
self-censorship by journalists, with journalists comply-
ing with state secrecy requests to ensure continued ac-
cess to official information, or because they are per-
suaded by governments’ national security arguments 
(Bakir, 2013). In the UK, press self-censorship is institu-
tionalised through the Defence Advisory (DA) Notice 
system where editors unofficially seek advice on secu-
rity matters before publishing (Creevy, 1999). While 
The Guardian did not seek such guidance before pub-
lishing its first story for fear of provoking an injunction 
(Purvis, 2014), British media largely complied with the 
DA notice issued by the British government as Snow-
den’s leaks broke, barely covering the story, unlike the 
American and German press (Harding, 2014, p. 178; 
Moore, 2014; Rusbridger, 2013).  
Research on the propagandising of the domestic 
press in liberal democracies by their own intelligence 
agencies finds journalistic collaboration with intelli-
gence agencies as well as opposition to them. Collabo-
rative journalistic practices include spreading intelli-
gence-sourced, but disguised, propaganda (Lashmar, 
2013; Olmsted, 2011); and providing uncritical report-
age of intelligence agencies (Bakir, 2013). Systematic 
analysis of press coverage of Snowden’s leaks shows 
the International Herald Tribune acting as apologists 
for US surveillance, and focusing on tangential issues 
(such as bilateral foreign relations) rather than ad-
dressing issues of surveillance over-reach (Goss, 2015). 
British press representation of the Snowden leaks privi-
leges political sources seeking to justify and defend the 
security services. Prominent press themes are that so-
cial media companies should do more to fight terror, 
and that while surveillance of politicians is problematic, 
surveillance of the public should be increased. There is 
minimal discussion around human rights, privacy impli-
cations or regulation of the surveillance (Cable, 2015). 
Moving beyond content analyses of the press, journal-
ists’ own analysis of US mainstream press coverage of 
Snowden shows it supporting the Obama administra-
tion’s War on Terror justification and vilifying Snow-
den. It also highlights two dominant narratives, both 
centered on Snowden’s motives: treacherous spy and 
heroic whistle-blower (Epstein, 2014; Grey, 2013; Pa-
pandrea, 2014). Such narratives tally with Greenwald’s 
description of press tropes on national security whistle-
blowers, these focusing on the person of the whistle-
blower rather than the leaks’ substance and including 
tropes of madness, loners and losers. 
As well as intelligence agency practices of secrecy 
and propaganda and the collaboration of journalists 
with intelligence agencies, the literature also docu-
ments oppositional journalistic practices of highlighting 
intelligence failures, demanding reform (de Vries, 
2012) and exposing secret policies (Bakir, 2013; Mura-
kami Wood & Wright, 2015). However, oppositional 
journalistic practices are far more rare than collabora-
tive journalistic practices. As such, it is unsurprising 
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that Snowden sought very specific journalists for his 
leak—Poitras and Greenwald. Laura Poitras is a US 
filmmaker who had made critical documentaries about 
the post-“9/11” US national security state (Poitras, 
2006, 2010). Greenwald has cultivated a reputation for 
independence as a national security political blogger 
and opinion writer since 2005 when, as a constitutional 
and civil rights lawyer, he blogged to more widely 
counter the Bush government’s radical and extreme 
theories of executive power, extensively covering the 
2005 story of NSA warrantless wire-tapping (Green-
wald, 2014, p. 1). Snowden believed that Greenwald 
would understand the leaks’ significance, and be able 
to withstand pressure to patriotically self-censor 
(Greenwald, 2014, p. 2; Harding 2014, p. 71). Certainly, 
Greenwald is publicly scathing of mainstream press re-
porting of politics (Newsnight, 2013), for instance, 
lambasting the Washington Post for “excessive close-
ness to the government, reverence for the institutions 
of the national security state, routine exclusion of dis-
senting voices” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 54). Although 
Greenwald took the leaks to The Guardian, a newspa-
per he had joined in August 2012 as an online daily 
columnist, attracted by its “history of aggressive and 
defiant reporting” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 67), he states 
that he retained complete editorial independence. In 
2014, he started The Intercept where he and Poitras 
continue to report on Snowden’s leaks. The Intercept 
belongs to First Look Media, founded in October 2013 
by billionaire ethical investor and eBay founder, Pierre 
Omidyar. The Intercept is grounded in the principle that 
its journalists have absolute editorial freedom and in-
dependence (Rusbridger, 2013). 
Thus, Intelligence Studies and Journalism Studies 
suggest, and the Snowden case study demonstrates, 
the continuing practice of a wide range of secrecy-
maintaining techniques; and indicates journalistic pro-
motion of the agenda of intelligence agencies and their 
political masters. These twin strategies of secrecy and 
propaganda challenge the press’ accuracy and inde-
pendence from the state, compromising its ability to 
act as a meaningful public oversight mechanism re-
garding intelligence agencies. Simultaneously, howev-
er, the Snowden case study also evidences the rare 
journalistic oppositional practice of exposing a secret 
intelligence policy, pointing to the continued relevance 
of the press in ensuring public oversight of the political-
intelligence elite. It also highlights three conditions that 
foster effective press oversight. These comprise, firstly, 
international cooperation to enable journalists to avoid 
their own nation’s censorship. For instance, fearing 
that its stories would be closed down in the UK by po-
lice seizing the data from The Guardian’s offices, The 
Guardian collaborated with The New York Times, ex-
changing its exclusive access to Snowden’s documents 
for US First Amendment protection (Harding, 2014, pp. 
186-189). The second condition for effective press 
oversight of intelligence agencies is political independ-
ence of press ownership, with voluminous and critical 
reporting coming from The Guardian (funded by the 
Scott Trust Limited, ensuring the newspaper’s inde-
pendence from commercial or political interference) 
and The Intercept (funded by a pro-transparency ethi-
cal investor). The third condition is the support of at 
least part of the mainstream national press. Greenwald 
(2015) explains that, before breaking Snowden’s story, 
they considered avoiding mainstream press, but found 
themselves depending on the press’ institutional re-
sources. These comprised technical experts to secure 
the data; editorial experts to ensure robust stories; and 
financial resources and legal expertise as they had 
since spent millions of dollars on legal fees. As such, it 
is doubtful whether, had Snowden acted alone as a cit-
izen, posting his data online, or if Greenwald had mere-
ly blogged about the story, that these acts of hierar-
chical sousveillance would have generated similar 
attention to the mass surveillance policy. 
6. Discussion  
Synthesising three normally separate fields of study—
Surveillance Studies, Intelligence Studies and Journal-
ism Studies—generates insights into the nature of con-
temporary state intelligence surveillance; the role of 
public oversight mechanisms in holding surveillant in-
telligence agencies to account; and how to resist such 
surveillance. These areas are thoroughly under-
researched in all three fields. The Snowden case study 
provides conceptual tools and a framework for evaluat-
ing how contemporary state intelligence surveillance 
may be held to account and resisted, identifying areas 
for future productive research.  
6.1. Conceptual Tools: The Veillant Panoptic 
Assemblage 
Addressing Lyon’s (2015) observation that Surveillance 
Studies ignores the technical infrastructure of global in-
formation flow and surveillance, lacks clarity on who is 
doing the surveillance, and lacks understanding of sur-
veillance cultures, I introduce a new term: “veillant 
panoptic assemblage”. This term aims to bring concep-
tual clarity to the complicated post-Snowden condition 
of mutual watching, while also highlighting resistive 
possibilities to surveillance. Retaining the words “pan-
optic” (with its centralizing, state-oriented, disciplinary 
functions) and “assemblage” (emphasizing the multi-
site, fluctuating nature of data capture to form data-
doubles), and bringing these together with “veillance” 
(highlighting that flows of watching are multidirection-
al involving citizens, retail and communications com-
panies, and state agencies) accurately describes the 
contemporary condition of mutual watching. Given the 
various types of veillance possible (including not just 
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surveillance but also sousveillance, counterveillance, 
univeillance and equiveillance), this term also suggests 
that resistance to surveillance may be attempted in dif-
ferent ways, rather than focusing scholars’ attention 
solely on surveillance.  
6.2. A Framework for Evaluating Equiveillance 
With the exception of NSA collection of US citizens’ 
telephone metadata, the American and British review 
groups, reports and oversight boards into intelligence 
agencies’ surveillance concluded that the mass surveil-
lance programs are valuable and effective in protecting 
the nation’s security and producing useful foreign intelli-
gence. The state, then, refuses to give up its surveillance 
of digital communications, as it is too valuable. Accept-
ing the inevitability of surveillance, Mann’s goal is to 
move us towards a state of equiveillance, where there is 
equality between the forces of surveillance and sousveil-
lance. However, can the veillant panoptic assemblage 
that describes post-Snowden society ever become an 
equiveillant panoptic assemblage? Further research into 
what would constitute an equal balance in power rela-
tionships between state and individual concerning sur-
veillance would be valuable. For now, though, Mann and 
Ferenbok (2013, p. 30) suggest it would encompass 
power mechanisms to readily enact change from below, 
embracing innovations to the system, participatory pro-
jects, whistleblower protections and encouragement of 
genuine public debate. This final section evaluates the 
health of these civic and technological infrastructures in 
light of the Snowden case study. 
In terms of innovations to the system, as well as 
technology industry campaigns for changes to surveil-
lance and transparency laws and practices, several 
leading technology companies developed encryption 
technologies so that the state could not compel them 
to disclose people’s communications. This form of 
univeillance blocks surveillance while encouraging citi-
zens to communicate as they normally would (includ-
ing practices of sousveillance). This has caused intelli-
gence agencies much concern, as noted in public 
speeches and intelligence oversight reports, which ex-
press dire warnings about the internet “going dark” 
(ISC, 2015, p. 9; RUSI, 2015, p. 14). Indeed, given the 
centrality of commercial surveillance in the veillant 
panoptic assemblage, these univeillance-enabling ac-
tions, alongside trenchant lobbying by global telecom-
munications service providers for legislative change, 
are likely to be key drivers spurring governments to re-
vise their surveillance laws and oversight of their intel-
ligence agencies’ surveillance powers. The struggle be-
tween corporations seeking to retain consumer trust in 
the privacy of their communications, and the state’s 
secret demands for access, will no doubt continue to 
play out. Critical attention should be paid to ensuing 
privacy/surveillance rhetoric and arms races, and levels 
of trust in corporate and state surveillance practices. 
Unlike innovations to the system, it is less clear how 
participatory projects have fared in enacting change 
from below. Certainly, the American and British review 
groups and oversight boards set up to study intelli-
gence agencies’ surveillance broadened their scope of 
consultation beyond official intelligence oversight bod-
ies to include wider members of the legislature and civ-
il society, especially NGOs and telecommunications 
companies. This is a good start, but what weight was 
given to concerns expressed by these broader voices, 
and which voices were most influential, would be wor-
thy of systematic study. For instance, in the UK, JUS-
TICE, Liberty and Rights Watch UK told the ISC inquiry 
that they were against bulk collection of data in princi-
ple because of its ‘chilling effect’ on a free society, and 
that their opposition would remain even if such collec-
tion was proven to have averted terrorist acts and even 
if properly legally authorised (ISC, 2015, pp. 35-36). The 
ISC, however, simply took the opposite view: ‘we do 
not subscribe to the point of view that it is acceptable 
to let some terrorist attacks happen in order to uphold 
the individual right to privacy—nor do we believe that 
the vast majority of the British public would’ (ISC 2015, 
p. 36). By contrast, the more critical Anderson (2015) 
and RUSI (2015) reports take on board a number of the 
views expressed by NGOs, arguing, for instance, for le-
gal limits on when and how communications may be 
intruded on, ‘even if those limits from time to time di-
minish the effectiveness of law enforcement and result 
in more bad things happening than would otherwise be 
the case’ (Anderson, 2015, p. 250). Whether their rec-
ommendations will be apparent in future British legis-
lation remains to be seen. 
The remaining civic and technological infrastruc-
tures for enacting change from below have fared less 
well. In terms of whistleblower protections, Snowden 
was not technically a whistleblower, as he did not fol-
low national security whistleblower protocols (which 
would have entailed giving his information to an au-
thorised member of Congress or Inspector General—a 
process that assumes that internal reform then ensues, 
but that Snowden had no faith in). As such, Snowden 
remains stranded in Russia and does not enjoy even 
the limited protections afforded to national security 
whistleblowers in the USA, despite initiating an inter-
national public and political debate that has led to re-
evaluations of surveillance policy and intelligence over-
sight. What constitutes a national security whistle-
blower therefore needs re-examining, including, as Pa-
pandrea (2014) suggests, a re-writing of the Espionage 
Act [1917] to clearly distinguish between leaks intend-
ed to reach the enemy and those intended to inform 
the US public. However, rather than address this fun-
damental question, The President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies (2013) 
merely recommends better and more continuous na-
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tional security employee vetting to prevent leaks; and 
that the Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection Board 
should be an authorised recipient for whistle-blower 
concerns related to privacy and civil liberties from in-
telligence employees. As such, whistle-blowing to the 
press is discouraged, diverted, and remains a weak 
formal mechanism to enact change from below, partic-
ularly given multiple indictments of national security 
whistleblowers by Obama under the Espionage Act. 
In terms of the final civic and technological infra-
structure for enacting change from below—
encouragement of a genuine public debate—this was 
certainly started by Snowden’s revelations, spear-
headed by The Guardian in the UK, and continued by 
The Intercept, among other press outlets. Yet, despite 
this stream of oppositional reporting, the focus of this 
debate in the wider American and British mainstream 
press is driven by politicians, and as such avoids issues 
of human rights and surveillance over-reach or regula-
tion (Cable, 2015; Goss, 2015). As the previous section 
identifies, three conditions foster effective public over-
sight of intelligence agencies via the press, namely: in-
ternational cooperation to enable journalists to avoid 
national censorship; political independence of press 
ownership; and support of at least part of the main-
stream press and their institutional resources (finan-
cial, technical, editorial and legal expertise). Further re-
search into these conditions would help us better 
understand how to increase oppositional journalistic 
practices (to the political-intelligence elite), rather than 
collaborative journalistic practices. Also in need of sys-
tematic research is what aspects of the public debate 
proved influential, particularly as the ISC invokes the 
will of the British public as erring on the side of bulk 
data collection to prevent terrorism. Indeed, the nine-
nations study on the European public’s attitudes to-
wards security-oriented surveillance technologies finds 
that, notwithstanding national differences, few people 
are willing to give up privacy in favour of more security 
(Pavone et al., 2015, p. 133). Further research into why 
different nations’ publics refuse this trade-off, and 
whether this is influenced by public discourses on sur-
veillance and privacy, is needed. In terms of continuing 
the public debate, the governments’ review groups and 
oversight boards agreed that technology companies 
should be allowed to be more transparent with their 
customers regarding government requests for citizens’ 
data, and that more government documents regarding 
surveillance should be declassified to build public trust 
(ISC, 2015; TechNet, 2013; TPCLOB, 2014a). The extent 
to which such transparency calls are enacted, and the 
quality and meaningfulness of the information entering 
the public sphere from intelligence agencies and com-
panies, requires monitoring, not least to ensure that 
partial declassification is not used to mislead the pub-
lic, as found in the political publicisation of previous in-
telligence programs (Bakir, 2013).  
To conclude, of the various civic and technological 
infrastructures for ensuring change from below, the 
strongest are innovations to the system, led by global 
telecommunications service providers; and participa-
tory projects, involving global telecommunications ser-
vice providers and NGOs. Far weaker are whistle-
blower protections and genuine public debate. It ap-
pears, then, that the veillant panoptic assemblage is 
still a long way from achieving equiveillance. 
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